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PAYGO FOR PUNCTUALITY
Luke Fowler*
ABSTRACT. The federal budgeting process is wrought with conflict that makes
it nearly impossible for the budget to be passed on time, or so it seems. One
aspect overlooked is the effects of statutory Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) rules. The
cursory evidence indicates PAYGO may be beneficial under certain
circumstances. The analysis relies on an Autoregressive-Moving-Average
(ARMA) time series model with data from appropriations bills signed into law
from fiscal years 1994 to 2014. The findings indicate mixed effects for PAYGO
statutes with a shorter budgeting timeline under the Budget Enforcement Act
of 1990, but a longer timeline under the Statutory PAYGO Act of 2010.
Additional findings suggest substantive relationships between the length of
the budgeting process and party polarization, presidential leadership, and the
economy.

INTRODUCTION
Since the Clinton administration, the federal government has
experienced three government shutdowns, in which neither a budget
nor a continuing resolution was in place to authorize continued
government spending into the new fiscal year.1 On other the hand,
during the same time period, there have only been two years in which
the federal budget was passed in its entirety before the beginning of
the fiscal year.2 Clearly, the federal budgeting process is wrought with
conflict that makes it nearly impossible for the budget to be passed on
time, or so it seems. Furthermore, state governments have
experienced some of the same strife in adopting budgets over the last
two decades. Thus, scholars have begun to take notice and focus on
fiscal gridlock in recent years (Klarner, Phillips, & Muckler, 2010,
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2012; Cummins, 2012). Their questions are substantively focused on
the causes of legislative gridlock in the budgeting process, and findings
have added depth to understanding the dynamics of the legislative
process. Thus, the factors in the process which lead to a longer or
shorter budgeting timeline are ripe for further analysis and additional
hypotheses.
Nevertheless, one aspect overlooked is the effects of statutory PayAs-You-Go (PAYGO) rules. There have essentially been two eras of
statutory PAYGO in contemporary Congressional budgeting: from 1990
to 2002 under the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), and from 2010 to
the present under the Statutory PAYGO Act. During the BEA PAYGO era,
federal deficit levels decreased and a balanced budget was achieved.
Thus, it has been contended that PAYGO was a watershed in managing
federal debt levels. However, this era also saw budgets passed on time
and two government shutdowns. During the latter era, federal deficits
have been among their highest in history. While they are arguably
beginning to come under control, the data remain mixed. Additionally,
passing a budget in general has seemed a herculean task with the
budgeting process stretching well into the next Congressional session,
with the exception of the budget for the 2010 fiscal year which was
finished by December. What remains to be determined is: how have
PAYGO rules affected the capacity of Congress to pass a budget on
time? The cursory evidence indicates PAYGO may be beneficial under
certain circumstances.
This article seeks to further explore that issue. The analysis relies
on an Autoregressive-Moving-Average (ARMA) time series model with
data from appropriations bills signed into law for fiscal years 1994 to
2014. The findings indicate mixed effects for the PAYGO statutes with
a shorter budgeting timeline under BEA PAYGO, but a longer timeline
under the Statutory PAYGO Act.
Additional findings suggest
substantive relationships between the length of the budgeting process
and party polarization, presidential leadership, and the economy.
PAYGO AND THE BUDGETING PROCESS
PAYGO adds a complicated dynamic to the budgeting process. In
general, PAYGO requires increases in expenditures or decreases in
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revenue to be offset by other increases in revenue or decreases in
spending. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974
sets out the modern framework of the federal process. However, in the
light of historic levels of deficits and debt, a new emphasis on
balancing the budget was placed, making way for amendments to
budgeting procedures. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (GRH), and later the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of
1987, placed new procedural rules surrounding deficits; namely,
statutory limits each year. However, by 1990, these procedural
changes had garnered criticism for focusing too much on deficit control
and not enough on spending control. This was the impetus for the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA), part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (Congressional Research Service, 1990,
2010a, 2011b; Doyle and McCaffrey, 1991). According to Doyle and
McCaffrey (1991, p. 28):
In summary, the Budget Enforcement Act changes the impetus
of GRH from deficit control to spending control within the
context of a rising deficit, frees the Appropriations Committees
from the threat of sequester arising from unforeseen economic
events, and attempts to shift the focus of the budget process
from a macro focus on the deficit number and the
sequestration percentage to a more intermediate level.
The BEA essentially marks the beginning of statutory PAYGO at the
federal level. Of the several changes adopted in 1990, two are of
particular note: 1) the emphasis changed to limiting spending, not
deficit growth; and, 2) discretionary appropriations were categorized
into packages with specific spending targets and caps for each. These
two changes set the foundation of the approach of PAYGO, and also
limited the context in which sequestration of spending occurs (Doyle
and McCaffrey, 1991). PAYGO relies on sequesters to control direct
spending. In budgetary terms, sequesters are triggers for automatic
across-the-board cuts to programs once spending limitations have
been reached within spending categories (Congressional Research
Service, 1990, 2010a, 2011b; Doyle & McCaffrey, 1991). That is, to
control spending, once the statutory spending limits are reached for a
spending category all programs are cut to keep spending from
exceeded the statutory limit.
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Enforcements of these mechanisms were ultimately the
responsibility of the President, once the budget was being
implemented, to control spending and ensure budget resolutions do
not exceed the statutory limitations. The formal procedures of the
sequester mechanisms relied on the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget as the scorekeeper to report three times a year to Congress:
with the President’s proposed budget, at the mid-session review of the
budget, and a final report 15 days after Congress adjourned. The first
two reports were informational to Congress, so they could make
adjustments in appropriations bills in anticipation of exceeding
spending limits (Doyle & McCaffrey, 1991; Congressional Research
Service, 2010a). However, if the final report indicated the statutory
limits were indeed violated, “the President was required to issue an
order making across-the-board cuts of nonexempt spending programs
within that category” (Congressional Research Service, 2010a, p. 4).
However, “Congress was able to use points of order to enforce them as
well” (Congressional Research Service, 2010a, p. 4). These points of
order were binding within the Congressional budgeting process, and
were used to keep appropriations from violating limitations before the
President was forced to order a sequester. Congress was made aware
of anticipated funding excesses and had available the opportunity and
tools to circumvent reaching statutory limits (Congressional Research
Service, 2010a, 2011b, 2013). Thus, the PAYGO rules played into the
Congressional budget process too, as Congressional leadership was
apprehensive to allow sequestration to happen and cede
programmatic funding control to the White House. That is, when
informed of an anticipated violation of spending limits, Congress could
either work to reduce programmatic spending internally or allow the
President to order across-the-board cuts, ultimately without
Congressional input. Congress, for the most part, remained pro-active
and managed to reduce spending before the sequester order was
necessary (Congressional Research Service, 2010a, 2011b, 2013).
The BEA era of statutory PAYGO expired on October 1, 2002, at the end
of the 2002 fiscal year (Congressional Research Service, 2010a).
Although the statutory requirements of PAYGO expired, Congress
still had the opportunities to use points of order established under the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to enforce spending limitations.
However, these points of order can be waived under the rules of both
chambers.
In the Senate, it requires a simple majority or
supermajority, depending on the point of order; in the House, it
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required special rules to be adopted by the chamber (Bradford &
Scogin, 2008; Congressional Research Service, 2013). In both cases,
these rules only applied to Congressional budgeting and did not trigger
any action from the President if spending limitations were violated.
Furthermore, spending limitations could easily be waived during the
process and without the consent from the president. That is, with
statutory limitations, the President has to sign legislation increasing
spending limitations, but with chamber rules setting the limitations,
expenditure ceilings could be raised with a simple majority vote
(Congressional Research Service, 2007; Bradford & Scogin, 2008).
Thus, PAYGO under Congressional rules did not have the binding power
that statutory PAYGO carried. This period of budgeting, though, was
defined by the ‘Great Recession’ as much as any other factor as the
U.S. experienced stagnation in economic growth and employment
rates (Grusky, Western, & Wimer, 2011).
On February 12, 2010, the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010
reestablished statutory PAYGO rules for the first time in almost a
decade. Like the previous era of PAYGO, it was designed to limit
increases in the deficit caused by new direct spending or revenue
legislation, through the use of sequestration mechanism
(Congressional Research Service, 2010b). Theoretically, this would be
a return to the system established under the BEA, with no notable
difference in the design for spending and deficit control. However, the
specific rules and spending limitations under the new PAYGO system
were updated to address contemporary budgeting issues (See
Congressional Research Service, 1990, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, and
2011b for more details on the specific legislative differences between
the BEA and the Statutory PAYGO Act). The Budget Control Act of 2011
further supported this by reinforcing discretionary spending caps and
the sequester mechanism (Congressional Research Service, 2011a).
Data on the outcome of the budgeting process indicates PAYGO
had notable impacts.
Figure 1 displays the federal budget
surplus/deficit in real dollars and as a ratio to gross domestic product
(GDP) from fiscal years 1985 to 2014, with the eras of statutory PAYGO
indicated. As figure 1 indicates, BEA PAYGO was instrumental in
bringing budget deficits under control. With the peak coming during
the late 1990s, when the federal budget resulted in a budget surplus.
Following the expiration of statutory PAYGO at the end of 2002, budget
deficits and debt remained relatively stable through 2007. After 2007,
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FIGURE 1
Budget Surplus/Deficit and Surplus/Deficit to GDP Ratio per Fiscal
Year in Real (2009) Dollars: 1985 to 2014
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Note: From left to right, the first box indicates the BEA PAYGO era, and
the second box indicates the Statutory PAYGO Act era.
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2014).
there is a definitive period of growth that occurs in the deficit. The
Statutory PAYGO Act era, starting in 2010, again, sees the beginning of
budget deficits and debt coming under control. Note that these trends
are heavily influenced by the economy, but there does appear to be a
correlation between PAYGO and reductions in the federal budget
deficit.
Figure 2 displays the federal expenditures in real (2009) dollars
and as a ratio to GDP from fiscal years 1985 to 2014, with the eras of
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statutory PAYGO indicated. Trends for the real dollars of expenditures
indicate a stable, marginal increase over time until 2007; however, by
2014, there are marked inclines in this trend. On the other hand, the
expenditures to GDP ratio bring these trends into a little more
perspective, as expenditures naturally increase over time. This ratio
indicates expenditures were reduced during BEA PAYGO, but began to
climb again after its expiration. However, in the Statutory PAYGO Act
era, expenditures appear to be coming under control. Nevertheless,
the true impacts of the Statutory PAYGO Act on deficits may remain to
be seen for some time, as these new statutory rules have only been in
effect for a few years.
FIGURE 2
Federal Expenditures (in billions) and Expenditures to GDP Ratio per
Fiscal Year in Real (2009) Dollars: 1985 to 2014
4,000.0

30.0

3,500.0

25.0

3,000.0
20.0

2,500.0
2,000.0

15.0

1,500.0

10.0

1,000.0
5.0

500.0

Expenditures

2013

2011

2009

2007

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

1995

1993

1991

1989

1987

0.0

1985

0.0

Expenditures to GDP ratio

Note: From left to right, the first box indicates the BEA PAYGO era, and
the second box indicates the Statutory PAYGO Act era.
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2014).
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Table 1 presents a further comparison of deficits and expenditures
across the budgetary eras. Across the board, there are three
noteworthy trends. First, the era in which deficits and expenditures
saw the greatest reduction was during the BEA PAYGO era. Second,
budgeting after the expiration of BEA PAYGO era saw an explosion of
deficits and expenditures, reversing the trends from the previous two
decades. Finally, the Statutory PAYGO Act appears to have resulted in
marked increases in all these indicators as well. These figures
considered together indicate PAYGO has an important impact on the
outcome of the federal budgeting process. These charts also may
indicate there is a different relationship for BEA era compared to the
Statutory PAYGO Act era; however, that difference may dissipate over
time. The effects on deficit and expenditure reductions are fairly
obvious to ascertain, given that is the direct aim of the PAYGO rules.
However, the timing of the budget may prove to be an externality,
where the changing of the dynamics of budgetary negotiations has
impacted the pace at which appropriations bills proceed through the
budgetary process.
TABLE 1
Comparisons of Average Fiscal Year Deficits and Expenditures across
Budgeting Eras
Budget Rules Era

Gramm-RudmanHollings (19851990)
Budget Enforcement
Act (1991-2003)
Congressional
rules/Non-statutory
PAYGO (2003-2010)
Statutory PAYGO Act
(2011-2014)

Deficit (in
Billions,
Real 2009
dollars)
-322.6

Deficit to Expenditures Expenditures
GDP Ratio (in Billions, to GDP Ratio
Real 2009
Dollars)
-3.7
1844.3
21.2

-139.7

-1.4

2170.8

19.4

-628.9

-4.3

2987.2

20.7

-844.7

-5.6

3334.2

21.7

Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2014).
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Figure 3 provides a comparison of the timeline for appropriations
bills from fiscal years 1991 to 2014. The figure displays the date the
president signed into the law the first appropriations bill, the last
appropriations bill, and the median date of all appropriations bills for
each fiscal year.3 This comparison provides a cursory look at the
budgeting timeline for each fiscal year, with the eras of PAYGO
indicated. The average date of the first appropriations bill passed
during fiscal years with statutory PAYGO was October 15; the average
median date for appropriations bills, November 21; and, the average
date for the last appropriations bill, December 17. For fiscal years
within the intermediary non-PAYGO era, the average date for the first
appropriations date was October 14; the average median date for
appropriations bills, November 15; and, the average date for the last
appropriations bill, January 19. The basic comparison of dates does
indicate that the budgetary process as whole ended earlier under
FIGURE 3
Date First, Median, and Last Appropriations Bills Were Signed into
Law by President by Fiscal Year: FY1991 to 2014
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Note: From left to right, the first box indicates the BEA PAYGO era, and
the second box indicates the Statutory PAYGO Act era.
Source: U.S. Library of Congress (2014).
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PAYGO, even though this is not a trend that seems to stretch across all
appropriations bills.
However, the charts do indicate that the effects under the BEA and
the Statutory PAYGO Act seem to be different. When separated into
two eras, the average date for the first appropriations bill for BEA
PAYGO was September 2; the average median date for appropriations
bills, October 22; and, the average date for the last appropriations bill
was November 25. On the other hand, the average date for the first
appropriations bill for the Statutory PAYGO Act era was February 19;
the average median date for appropriations bills was February 20; and,
the average date for the last appropriations bill was February 21.
When separated, the results certainly indicate PAYGO is having some
effect on the budgeting timeline, with BEA era resulting in earlier
appropriations bills than both the intermediary PAYGO era of the
2000’s and the Statutory PAYGO Act era.
Why would PAYGO affect the timeline of appropriations bills,
though? PAYGO, at its heart, is a symptom of fiscal discipline
associated with political regimes. This in turn represents a different
status quo associated with the budget negotiation process. Namely, it
places hard and fast restrictions on spending and deficits both
procedurally and as a goal. This provides an additional obstacle for
budgetary actors to grapple with as they put together a financing plan
for the federal government. Therefore, it affects the speed at which
the process may occur. However, this may play out as a positive or a
negative effect. If it is a negative effect (meaning PAYGO decreases
the length of the budgetary process), it suggests that PAYGO rules limit
options, focus goals, and limit conflict. Fiscal gridlock (discussed more
below) is the primary result of conflict from budgetary actors. Much of
this conflict is the result of trying to create agreement when there are
potentially infinite alternatives available. That is, when there are an
infinite number of options in distributing resources, deciding between
those options becomes very difficult. Every actor can develop their own
preference for that distribution with little overlap or agreement
between actors. However, when the number of potential options is
greatly reduced, agreement becomes easier. That is, when there are
very strict rules surrounding the distribution of resources, it is much
easier to find agreement because the alternatives for doing so are
more easily compared. There are only a finite number of alternatives
which creates much more overlap in the preferences for budgetary
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actors. Based on the cursory look at the dates of appropriation bill
signings, it is likely BEA PAYGO was conducive to this experience.
On the other hand, if PAYGO has a positive effect (meaning PAYGO
increases the length of the budgetary process), it suggests that
budgeting actors are unwilling to compromise within the restrictions
set. That is, PAYGO not only limits options, it also limits the ability to
satisfy all interests. Without spending or deficit control, every “pet
project” can be funded; every interest can be given resources without
consideration of the overarching financial consequences. If the ability
to satisfy all interests is limited and budgeting actors refuse to
compromise, the process may come to a standstill. That is, when the
spending cap is reached, if the benefactors of program A and program
B both become entrenched in their position, a stalemate is likely to
result. Even in the circumstances in which one benefactor can exert
political capital to see their program win, the process of doing so slows
down the timeline of the budgeting process. Based on the cursory look
at the dates of appropriation bill signings, it is likely PAYGO under the
Statutory PAYGO Act is conducive to this experience. While there is
little evidence from previous scholarship to indicate why these
separate trends exist, it is likely the result of the focus on fiscal
discipline associated with the PAYGO eras. As discussed below, fiscal
gridlock has been of interest to scholars for some time, but few have
ventured into looking at the causes of late budgets and none have
focused specifically on PAYGO. Nevertheless, both theory and the
cursory evidence presented in the previous figures indicate PAYGO
affects the budgeting process and those affects likely impact the
timeline of appropriations bills. Therefore, there is a need to
investigate further this phenomenon.
FISCAL GRIDLOCK
There is a litany of other potential political and economic factors
which contribute to gridlock, though. Previous scholarship has
identified party polarization and divided government, presidential
leadership, and economics among other things. The favorite target of
scholars researching gridlock has been divided government for some
time, with numerous researchers finding that divided government has
an important effect on both the passage of legislation and fiscal
outcomes (Mayhew, 1991; Alt & Lowry, 1994; Poterba, 1994;
Clingermayer & Wood, 1995; Bohn & Inman, 1996; Clarke, 1998;
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Binder, 1999; Conley, 2002; Anderson, Lassen, & Nielsen, 2012;
Klarner, Phillips, & Muckler, 2010; Kousser, 2010). Researchers have
continued to develop their findings and further challenge the
understanding of inter-party dynamics in the legislative process (Kelly,
1993; Binder, 1999). Understanding these findings, though, may
depend on what is being measured, as Anderson, Lassen, and Nielsen
(2012) and Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler (2010) both found divided
government led to budgetary delays, but Gilligan and Matsusaka
(1995; 2001) found little to no effects on state spending. However,
other scholars point to increasing party polarization as the culprit
(Clarke, 1998; Binder, 1999; Masket, 2007), especially as it
exacerbates the conflict between parties under divided government
(Kousser, 2010; Cummins, 2012). The understanding of the effects of
divided government have evolved to take note of the increasing impact
of party polarization, as the gap in ideological beliefs between parties
has a substantive influence on inter-party dynamics.
Party polarization has been a definitive trend over the last several
decades, with several scholars noting it as well as the impacts it has
had on the legislative process (for more detail on party polarization,
see Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani, 2003; Theriault, 2006, 2008;
Theriault & Rohde, 2011; Sorensen, 2014; Gray et al., 2015). Scholars
have measured these divisions in numerous ways including party votes
(Coleman, 1997; Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani, 2003), party unity
scores, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores (Brewer,
Mariani, & Stonecash, 2002; Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani, 2003),
and American Conservative Union (ACU) scores (Collie and Mason,
2000). Regardless of the measurement, though, the trends appear
the same. Furthermore, Woon and Anderson (2012) specifically
analyze the political bargaining process for appropriations bills. The
findings indicate appropriations bills are not plagued by delays when
ideological differences between leadership are minimized and
distribution of appropriations is maximized. In other words, as long as
polarization is minimized by key players, the process moves forward.
Alternatively, Hanson (2014) finds that majority party leadership is
most likely to take measures to ease passage of appropriations bills
when the majority party is ideologically divided, distant from the
minority, or holding onto a thin margin of control. In sum, the existing
evidence indicates partisan and ideologically based conflicts can
create gridlock in the legislative process. Nevertheless, given the
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previous research, it is expected that party polarization will have an
impact on the budgeting timeline.
As the budgeting process begins and ends with the president, his
leadership throughout the process cannot be ignore. Namely,
presidential popularity (Canes-Wrone & de Marchi, 2002) and coalition
building capacity (Weatherford, 1993; Peake, 2002) have been related
to legislative success of his agenda. To that effect, Anderson and
Woon (2014) find the bargaining process for appropriations bill is
heavily affected by the president’s position and his ability to negotiate
with Congress. Legislators are more likely to support the president
when he is popular, as they can tie their electoral fates to him and use
his support later to push their own agenda. Furthermore, campaigning
for Congressional elections can help build legislative support for
Presidents after elections (Herrnson, Morris, & McTague, 2011).
Additionally, not all presidents are equal in their ability to shape politics
in Washington, or in their leadership ability. Skowronek (1993) argues
Presidents are elected in a political regime in which they must align
with or fight against, and this shapes their ability to lead. On the other
hand, Barber (1985) contends Presidential character is defined by the
energy he invests and his impression of his actions, which shapes his
ability to effectively lead the nation. Therefore, it cannot be expected
that the budgeting process under all presidents is the same, when the
political landscape and presidential character of the Commander-inChief can differ significantly between administrations. For instance,
the last three administrations (Clinton, Bush, and Obama) have seen
both different leadership styles and political landscapes. Thus, it is
expected that presidential leadership will have an impact on the
budgeting timeline as well.
Of course, the implications of economics on the legislative and
budgeting processes cannot be ignored, especially considering the
economic history of the period in question (Grusky, Western, & Wimer,
2011). The availability of resources is a source of conflict with any bill
that requires funding, as it is in natural competition with all other
sources. Additionally, as the purpose of budgeting is determining how
limited resources are to be distributed between competing interests
(Key, 1940) it requires values to be measured in dollars creating
conflict in itself. At the federal level, two important indicators of
availability of resources are economic growth and public debt.
Economic growth suggests a growing tax base and more available
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revenue. While public debt can be measured in numerous ways and
can likely have many implications, the simplest relationship may be
that as borrowing increases Congress is more willing to rely on
borrowed money to balance the budget, and thus seek more resources
which will ameliorate conflict in funding programs. In other words, as
debt grows, Congress is likely more willing to rely on it to balance the
budget; inversely, a decreasing debt would likely mean Congress has
prioritized paying debt over spending in other areas, resulting in
budgeting conflict. During the Clinton administration, balancing the
budget and reducing the debt were set as priorities causing money that
would otherwise go to programs to be earmarked for those purposes,
in turn reducing the potential resources to programs. Alternatively,
borrowing was heavily relied on during the Bush administration to fund
the War on Terror, rather than create more conflict by balancing it
against tax cuts and spending in other programs (Schick, 2007).
Therefore, a growing economy and availability of borrowed money
means more resources, reducing competition. It is expected that both
economic factors will have an important impact on the budgeting
process.
METHODOLOGY
Data and Variables
Since the budget process is a process that is dynamic over time,
an innovative dataset had to be created to capture the potential for
variables that vary at different time intervals to affect the outcome of
the process. The first step was to determine the level of observation.
As the budget process plays out over days, it was determined it was
best suited to measure the data at this level. Thus, the level of
observation are days in the budgeting process. Every observation is
for a specific day in the budgeting timeline; these will be referred to as
the observation dates. It is assumed the budgeting timeline for each
fiscal year begins on January 3 of each year as the beginning of the
Congressional session; while this may vary slightly in some years, it
creates an objective point of beginning for budgeting in each fiscal
year. There are two important considerations about this point to note
though. First, some initial budgeting events take place before this
date. For the purposes here, it is assumed that Congress as a whole
does not focus on the next fiscal year’s budget until the session has
started. Second, in some years, the budgeting process continues into
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the next Congressional session (i.e., a bill is not signed by the president
by January 3). In these cases, serial processing is assumed, not
concurrent processing; so the budget process for the next fiscal year is
not assumed to have started until after the previous one has been
concluded. To control for these effects, a dummy variable for those
years is included for the fiscal year that the budget process has been
stalled. This controls for the potential effects of having the process
delayed by the previous year’s budget.
While this set of assumptions can be made about the beginning of
the budgeting process, the end of the budget process is a little more
difficult to pinpoint, as most years include numerous appropriations
bills. To effectively compare between years, the analysis will focus on
three specific dates for the budgeting timeline for each fiscal year.
These three dates are: the date the first appropriations bill was signed,
the date the last appropriations bill was signed, and the median date
for all appropriations bill signed that year.4 This essentially captures
the effects for the first bill completed, the last bill completed, and the
bills completed in between. However, in some years, the same
appropriations bill may fall into multiple categories (i.e., when a
consolidated package is passed, rather than individual bills). Figure 3
(above) sums the distribution of dates for the passage of these bills.
In sum, the budgeting process is assumed to last from January 3, with
the noted exception, until the president signs the first and last
appropriations bill, and the median date of all appropriations bills. The
date of the Presidential signing was obtained from the U.S. Library of
Congress (2014) for each budget bill passed between 1993 and 2014.
There is a certain limitation associated with only considering one
bill at a time though. Again, this assumes serial processing by the
actors associated with each bill. However, by focusing on the order of
appropriations bills, rather than say the function of the bill, this does
not make any other assumptions about how concurrent processing
occurs for each bill. That is, it is assumed the factors causing the last
bill to be later than the first bill are the same every year and not a result
of some functional category, which does not eliminate the effects of
concurrent processing. It just does not specifically include them as an
analytical tool. This is a noted limitation and is taken into consideration
when developing conclusions.
The final issue concerning the organization of the data is which
fiscal years to include. It was determined the budget processes for
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Clinton, Bush, and Obama (to date) create a natural time period of
comparison across the last three administrations. Therefore, fiscal
years 1994 to 2014 are included in the analysis; the dataset runs from
January 3, 1993 to January 17, 2014. In total this creates a dataset
of 5866 observations days for the first appropriations bill, 6591
observation days for the median appropriations bill, and 7243
observation days for the last appropriation bill. Note that if there are
any days in between the date of signing for the appropriations bill and
the start of the next Congressional session, those dates are not
included in the dataset as they are not considered to have occurred
during a budgeting timeline.
With the data organized to analyze the dynamics of the budgeting
process, the dependent variable has to be an objective measure of the
outcome of that process in relation to time. Thus, the dependent
variable is measured as the number of days late the appropriations bill
is. That is, the budget process is “supposedly” to be completed by
September 31 each year to fund the fiscal year beginning October 1.
If the appropriations bill is not signed by October 1, it is late, leaving
the government without a financing plan. The number of days late is
measured as the number of calendar days between the first, median,
and last dates of presidential appropriations bill signings and October
1 of the fiscal year that the appropriations bill is meant to fund. Note
the variable is measured as days late so late bills carry a positive sign
while bills signed before October 1 would carry a negative sign (i.e.,
October 6 would be measured as 5, while September 26 would be
measured as -5). This dependent variable does not vary on a daily
basis but remains constant for the entire budgeting process for that
fiscal year. However, this is corrected for with the statistical analysis
technique outlined below, which is meant to correct for autocorrelation
issues of this nature; it takes into consideration the relative
relationship as it changes over time allowing for the dynamic nature to
be captured. That is, the statistical model takes into consideration how
the changes in the independent variables over time affect the
dependent variable, even though the dependent variable is constant,
without violating statistical assumptions.
To control for the effect of PAYGO, dummy variables were used to
compare different budgetary eras. First, a simple dummy variable was
used that compares only times with statutory PAYGO to times without
it. This would be the time period from the beginning of the dataset to
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the expiration of BEA PAYGO at the end of the 2002 fiscal year, and
beginning again with the signing of the Statutory PAYGO Act of 2010.
Second, as a cursory look at deficits and the timing of appropriations
bills indicate, the effects of BEA PAYGO and the Statutory PAYGO Act
may not be the same. Thus, an additional set of dummy variables is
used to break these eras apart to determine if all PAYGO is created
equally. Data on the dates of PAYGO were obtained from the U.S.
Library of Congress (2014).
To control for the effects of party polarization, data from the ADA
was utilized. The ADA measures how often members of each party vote
for selected legislation (See ADA (2015) for more information on these
scores).5 The difference between the voting percentages for
Republicans and Democrats on ADA selected legislation for each
Congress was used to measure the ideological distance between
parties in Congress (Brewer, Mariani, & Stonecash, 2002; Stonecash,
Brewer, and Mariani, 2003). To control for the effects of presidential
leadership, dummy variables for presidency compare dates when
Clinton or Bush (each with an individual dummy variable) were serving
as president to dates when Obama was serving. Data on dates of
presidency was obtained from the White House website (White House,
2014). Note that the dummy variables for PAYGO, divided government,
and presidential leadership vary at the daily level, as there are specific
dates in which these begin and end.
To control for economic trends, two variables were included: debt,
and gross domestic product (GDP). These variables fluctuate at
different rates, based on the availability of information. In the analysis,
these fluctuations are consistent with the rate of fluctuation in reality,
allowing for a modeling of effects based on the behavior of budgeting
actors. Debt fluctuates monthly, while GDP fluctuates at the quarterly
level. To code these, it was assumed debt numbers changed on the
first day of every month and GDP numbers changed on the first day of
every quarter. Data on public debt and GDP was obtained from the
Monthly Public Debt Statements from the U.S. Treasury and the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, respectively (U.S. Treasury, 2014; BEA,
2014).
In addition to the previously mentioned dummy variable concerned
with controlling for the effects of the budgetary process bleeding into
the next Congressional session, a time variable is essential to control
for effects of pressure to make statutory deadlines. These two
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variables will be referred to as the process control variables. This time
variable is measured as the number of days between the observation
date and the date when a government shutdown will occur. That is,
the date at which the current appropriations legislation expires. This
measure is included for two reasons. First, by using the number of
days from the date of observation to the date of a government
shutdown, it controls for the pressure associated with passing the
budget on-time.
Second, it, also, controls for the issue of time, by creating an
objective comparison between observations throughout the process
that may occur on different dates or process days, but have the same
effect due to their relationship with the end of the process, which is the
main interest here. However, the date of government shutdown, or the
date on which there must be a budget in place, can be moved, through
the use of continuing resolutions. To deal with this, as continuing
resolutions are passed, the new effective date for the government
shutdown is used to calculate the days until shutdown. That is, if on
September 15 there is no continuing resolution, the shutdown date is
October 1 and the days until shutdown is calculated as 16 days; if on
September 16 a continuing resolution is passed to providing funding
until October 10, the days until shutdown is calculated as 29 days. This
allows objectively for the analysis to consider the effects of the
predictors in relationship to how close or far away in time they were
made to the actual presidential signing date. Additionally, in the event
the government did shutdown, days until shutdown was recorded as a
negative number from the beginning date of the shutdown. In this way,
it is assumed that continuing resolutions do not reset the clock, but
simply add more time to it. That is, a continuing resolution is a
treatment for the problem but not a cure; it provides more time and
alleviates some pressure but pressure still remains. This is a limitation
in the research design. However, this assumption best captures the
length of time of the budgetary process as ending with a successful
appropriations bill, compared to alternatives, which treat continuing
resolutions as failures or ignore their implications all together. Data on
continuing resolutions was obtained from the U.S. Library of Congress
(2014).
Analysis Technique
Initial data exploration indicated an autocorrelation issue that was
beyond the capacity of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
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(Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006; Graddy & Wang, 2008).6 Further data
exploration7 suggested an Autoregressive-Moving-Average (ARMA)
model was the best solution for fitting the statistical model to the
causal model and available data (Hy & Woolscheid, 2008; Asteriou &
Hall, 2011). The autoregressive ARMA formula is defined as:
𝑝
𝑋𝑡 = 𝑐 + ∑𝑖=1 𝜑𝑖 𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡

where, 𝑋𝑡 is a series, 1,…., p are parameters of the model, c is a
constant, and t is white noise (Mills, 1990).
ARMA is based on the work of Box and Jenkins (1970) and was
developed for hypothesis testing in time-series analysis when there is
a (weak) stationary stochastic process. In contrast to OLS, the
autoregressive aspect assumes the output variable is linearly
dependent on its previous values, while the moving average controls
for observations that lie outside the norm (Box & Jenkins, 1970; Mills,
1990; Asterious & Hall, 2011). This allows for the estimations of
models in which outcome variables are highly dependent on their
previous values (see Box & Jenkins, 1970; or Mills, 1990 for more
details on ARMA estimation).
Given the assumptions that the budgeting process is a stationary
process that is only being affected by the changes in the political and
economic environment, the ARMA model allows for the estimation of
the effects of the environment on the process while considering the
role previous values have in predicting the outcome variable, in this
case the end of the budget process. Additionally, the organization of
the data assumes dependence between observation dates which is
taken into consideration by the ARMA model. Therefore, the ARMA
model best matches statistical assumptions with theoretical
assumptions and the available data. In comparison to other analysis
techniques, ARMA was chosen for its strengths in analyzing time-series
data and its fit with the causal model. The budgeting process, along
with the data for this analysis, is well fitted within these assumptions.
The Box and Jenkins (1970) methodology for model identification was
employed (NIST/SEMATECH, 2014). Review of the data distribution
and initial testing of ARMA forms indicated that a non-seasonal random
walk model best suits the data (see Mills, 1990 or NIST/SEMATECH,
2014 for more details on identifying and fitting forms of ARMA).8 This
special form is used to estimate the model here. Further diagnostic
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tests indicated the model was a good fit to the data, and no other
assumptions were violated.
RESULTS
Table 2 displays the results for the predictive models using the
date of the first, median, and last dates for appropriation bill signings
as the dependent variables, respectively. For brevity and continuity,
the results across all three dependent variables will be discussed
together. Note that in the discussion, models for each dependent
variable are paired, with the first model in each pair including PAYGO
and the process control dummy variables as well as the political and
economic variables, and the second model in the pair only including
the PAYGO and process control dummy variables to isolate the effects
of PAYGO.
First, Models 1 and 2, 5 and 6, and 9 and 10 show the results using
both PAYGO eras pooled together for the first, median, and last
appropriation bill dates, respectively. While all models indicate that
TABLE 2
Results for First, Median, and Last Appropriations Bills as Dependent
Variable
First Bill
-PAYGO
(pooled)
-BEA PAYGO
-Statutory
PAYGO Act
-Bush
-Clinton
-Polarization
-Debt
-GDP
-Days until
Shutdown
-Multi-session
Budget
Constant
Log L.
BIC
N

Model 1*
Model 2*
Model 3*
-2.101
9.404*

Model 4*
-

-

-

-

-22.734*
32.390*

-28.484*
73.679*

-112.784*
-30.836*
-3.800*
-7.77E-6*
32.179*
-.178*

-.295*

-113.663*
-24.930***
-3.691*
1.31E-5*
33.516*
-.178*

-.194*

120.530*

120.60***

121.321*

96.268*

-16.713
-30586.56
61259.24
5501

13.947
-33616.36
67276.1
5866

2.910
-30557.99
61210.73
5501

15.528
-32789.1
65630.27
5866
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Median Bill
-PAYGO
(pooled)
-BEA PAYGO
-Statutory
PAYGO Act
-Bush
-Clinton
-Polarization
-Debt
-GDP
-Days until
Shutdown
-Multi-session
Budget
Constant
Log L.
BIC
N
Last Bill
-PAYGO
(pooled)
-BEA PAYGO
-Statutory
PAYGO Act
-Bush
-Clinton
-Polarization
-Debt
-GDP
-Days until
Shutdown
-Multi-session
Budget
Constant
Log L.
BIC
N

Model 5*
-17.403*

Model 6*
5.781*

Model 7*
-

Model 8*
-

-

-

-58.515*
52.343*

-19.847*
57.520*

-86.355*
-18.824***
-2.620*
-4.10E-6***
18.213*
-.102*

-.153*

-91.816*
-9.304
-2.435*
-1.52E-5*
21.442*
-.098*

-.106*

91.926*

89.980*

93.996*

69.365*

76.789
-34319.21
68725.79
6226
Model 9*
-24.631*

40.678
-37002.91
74049.78
6591
Model 10*
-6.663*

116.403
-34181.69
68459.49
6226
Model 11*
-

46.178
-36389.69
72832.13
6591
Model 12*
-

-

-

-47.107*
14.085**

-15.552*
12.260*

-38.618*
6.866
.693*
-2.84E-6*
8.826*
-.007

-.014**

-43.33247*
10.463***
.797***
-9.10E-6*
10.731*
-.004

-.003

100.228*

95.225*

100.697*

88.153*

-59.646
-33201.82
66492.01
6877

64.330
-35601.86
71248.15
7242

-36.113
-33016.88
66130.95
6877

66.909
-35283.1
70619.53
7242

Note: statistical significance ***>.05, **>.01, *>.001.
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PAYGO does have a statistically significant relationship with each
dependent variable, there is a change in direction of the substantive
relationship as a result of the inclusion of political and economic
variables that occurs in the models for the first and median dates, but
not for the last appropriations bill date. Initially, the results suggest
PAYGO is having an effect on budgetary timelines, but that relationship
warrants further inquiry.
The more sophisticated modeling of PAYGO, though, sheds some
additional light on the relationship. Models 3 and 4, 7 and 8, and 11
and 12 show the results using the PAYGO eras separated, rather than
pooled, for the first, median, and last appropriation bill dates,
respectively. In this case, the results for both PAYGO dummy variables
are consistent in both substantive and statistical relationships across
all models, suggesting reliability. The results indicate that under BEA
PAYGO budgetary timelines tends to be shorter compared to the nonstatutory intermediate period, but under the Statutory PAYGO Act,
budgetary timelines tend to be longer. However, these findings do not
consider the budgeting timeline prior to BEA PAYGO, so there is a
notable limitation in the comparison. Furthermore, the comparisons of
the BIC scores across all twelve models for all three dependent
variables indicate the strongest models are those that incorporate the
separate PAYGO eras, rather than the models in which the two eras are
pooled. This suggests that the two forms of PAYGO are having different
effects on the budgeting process and should be considered separately.
Second, models 1 and 3, 5 and 7, and 9 and 11 show the results
for the models which include control variables for political and
economic conditions. For all variables, the substantive and statistically
significant relationship is consistent within dependent variables, with
the exception of debt, Clinton, and party polarization, suggesting
reliability for the mass of variables included. In the case of Clinton and
party polarization, the change in substance is between the first and
median bills and the last bill. This suggests a different relationship
occurs towards the end of the budgeting cycle compared to earlier. On
the political side, the results indicate that party polarization
consistently decreases the budgetary timeline in the process but
increases the timeline late in the process.
The results for the presidential variables indicate that the
budgeting process under the Obama administration has been
consistently longer than under the Bush and Clinton administrations,
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except for the last bill for Clinton, when controlling for other political
and economic variables. However, the relative relationship between
the Bush and Clinton administration differs when comparing the first
appropriations bill date to the median and last appropriations bill
dates. These results indicate that while the budgeting timeline for the
first appropriations bill tended to be shorter for the Clinton
administration, it also tended to be longer for other appropriations bills.
This suggests that there may be a high degree of variability within the
budgeting process affected by which appropriations bill is being
analyzed.
On the economic side, the results indicate there is stability for the
effects of GDP within dependent variables, but the effect changes
direction when comparing the first and median appropriations bills to
the last appropriations bill. For the first and median appropriations bill
dates, GDP has a negative relationship, meaning growth in GDP tends
to reduce the budgeting timeline. This suggests that budgeting during
a weak economy is more difficult as resources contract. However, for
the last appropriations bill, GDP has a positive relationship, meaning
GDP tends to have increased in the years when the budgeting timeline
also increased. On the other hand, the findings for debt are consistent
in their statistical significance, but not in their directional relationship.
As a whole, this indicates that debt has an impact on the budgeting
process but the substance of that relationship is still undetermined.
When the economic variables are considered together, the findings
indicate the economy is having an impact on the budgeting process but
that impact may vary depending on the specifics of the bills.
Third, across all four models, the substantive and statistical results
for the process control variables are stable within dependent variables,
suggesting reliability. However, days until shutdown experiences a
change between variables as the direction of the relationship is
different for the first and median bills compared to the last
appropriation bill. Given the lack of statistical significance, as well as
the findings concerning the last appropriations bill, it is likely that by
the time the last bill is being debated the threat of the process
continuing is less of a deterrent to making compromise. That is, early
in the process budgeting actors may be willing to acquiesce in the
interest of making deadlines, but by the time the last appropriations
bill is being finalized continuing resolutions are the order of the day
and the pressure to compromise has been dissipated as the deadline
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is pushed in procedural votes. The finding for the dummy variable
concerned with the budgeting process bleeding into the next
Congressional session is as expected.
Finally, as indicated above, the findings for the first and median
appropriations bills differ from the findings for the last appropriations
bill in a few notable places. Taken as a whole, this suggests there is a
different relationship happening late in the budgeting process than
early. Again, this is likely the result of the pressure associated with the
beginning of the fiscal year and continuing resolutions that have less
of an impact on compromises late in the process. Additionally, the
appropriations bills passed early on are likely to be the less
controversial, compared to those passed last. Thus, the last
appropriations bills passed most likely are affected differently based
on political and economic pressures than those passed early. Across
the board, the relationships appear consistent, but there is some
notable variation that indicates timing in the process does change the
effects, which supports the use of a times series analysis technique,
and does offer insight into the process.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The direct implications of PAYGO rules clearly apply to spending
control and deficit reduction, as a symptom of fiscal discipline.
However, in the process of affecting those issues, PAYGO also changes
the dynamics of the budget negotiation process as it signifies a political
focus of leadership on fiscal discipline. Statutory PAYGO reduces the
number of options available for financing government, by placing
enforceable rules around spending levels. In practice, PAYGO changes
the rules of the budgeting game, and as a result, has far reaching
implications for its outcomes. Furthermore, it represents a marked
emphasis on fiscal discipline. As the cursory evidence implies,
spending and deficits came under control while the BEA was in effect
and appear to be moving in the same direction under the Statutory
PAYGO Act. To the point of this article, though, there have also been
important implications for timeliness of passing the budget. The
effects of PAYGO can either be positive or negative for the timeline of
the budgeting process, depending on the reaction of budget actors. If
budget actors use the reduction of financing options as a means to find
compromise, there is much more opportunity for agreement as options
leading to disagreement are eliminated. Therefore, the budget
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negotiation process is simplified and the result is a shorter budgeting
timeline. On the other hand, if budget actors choose to become
entrenched in their position in the face of reduced options, there is less
opportunity for compromise. The negotiation process enters a
stalemate and fiscal gridlock is unavoidable. The result, then, is a
lengthened budgeting process. Based on results, it appears that
PAYGO at the federal level has experience with both effects.
The findings indicate PAYGO is having an important impact on the
budgeting process, but the relationship is notably different under the
BEA and the Statutory PAYGO Act. This finding adds an interesting and
sophisticated dynamic. After reviewing the results and the existing
literature, there are three possible explanations for the contradictory
relationship that is occurring. First, possibly the most obvious
explanation is the role of party polarization. Anecdotally, despite the
government shutdown and the conflict between President Bill Clinton
and Speaker Newt Gingrich, the Clinton era was a time of bipartisan
agreement on fiscal issues between a Democratic president and a
Republican Congress. On the other hand, during the Obama era, there
seems to be little common ground when the same partisan division of
institutional control has occurred.
Additionally, the Obama
administration has seen much larger intra-party polarization than the
Clinton administration. Scholarship on the subject does indicate that
party polarization has increased since the early 1990s (Sinclair, 2006;
Mann & Ornstein, 2012).
The statistical evidence indicates that party polarization actually
shortens the timeline for the first and median appropriation bills, but
leads to a lengthen timeline for the last bills. This is likely a result of
the increased controversy related to the appropriations bills signed at
the end of the process compared to the beginning. Additionally, during
times of greater party polarization and conflict, omnibus appropriations
packages are more common, so larger portions of the budget are
determined at the end of the budgeting cycle. This may create some
limitations in the statistical analysis presented. Nevertheless, the
results indicate the less controversial bills at the beginning of the
process are more quickly passed, most likely as party leadership are
choosing their battles and focusing on the more controversial
appropriations bills that take more time to pass. With the more
controversial appropriations bills, it is likely ideologies gaps both within
and between parties have created such a conflict that both sides are
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becoming entrenched in their positions rather than cooperating to
achieve results, which is supported by previous research (Clarke,
1998; Binder, 1999; Masket, 2007; Kousser, 2010; Cummins, 2012).
The findings on the issues of inter- and intra-party polarization present
a limitation to the findings here, and future research should continue
to evaluate how partisan conflict effects fiscal gridlock.
Second, while PAYGO under the BEA and the Statutory PAYGO Act
follow the same theory, there are some nuanced differences in the
legislation about the specific rules, many of which are relative to
entitlements and what constitutes PAYGO eligible bills (See
Congressional Research Service, 1990, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, and
2011b for more details on the specific legislative differences between
the BEA and the Statutory PAYGO Act). These may seem superficial,
but they may also be the definitive difference in the effects on the
budgeting timeline. The legislative rules of the Statutory PAYGO Act
may be so cumbersome to navigate that it leads to a lengthened
budgeting timeline, compared to both the BEA and non-statutory
intermediary PAYGO eras. A cursory comparison of provisions does
seem to support this (Congressional Research Service, 1990, 2010a,
2010b, 2011a, 2011b). However, while the specific rules can be
examined, there is little means by which to test this explanation, as
concluding from a content analysis that the Statutory PAYGO Act is a
more complex piece of legislation than the BEA is not enough to
establish causality. Future research should consider the nuanced
difference between the BEA and the Statutory PAYGO Act when
evaluating the effects of PAYGO, and seek ways to test the effects of
these differences to determine the most effective form of PAYGO.
Finally, possibly the simplest explanation, the Statutory PAYGO Act
has only been in effect for a relatively short period of time. Nonstatutory PAYGO was the order of the day for nearly a decade when the
Statutory PAYGO Act was signed. The Statutory PAYGO Act, though, has
only been in use through four budgeting cycles. Thus, the actors in the
budgeting process have to have some time to learn the new system, as
they have limited experience working with PAYGO under the new set of
rules. During that learning process, adopting a budget is likely to be a
longer process, because there is less familiarity with the nuances.
More importantly, though, they may need time to adjust to the renewed
focus on fiscal discipline that is now being implemented. During nonstatutory PAYGO, this emphasis faded, and budget actors must now
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refocus their efforts to these goals. As the data on expenditures and
deficits indicate, the results are not flattering for the Statutory PAYGO
Act when only the existing data is considered. However, future trends
may prove more positive, based on current projects from the U.S. Office
of Management and Budget (2014). While there are not long-term
projections for the signing of appropriations bills, if this were to follow
the same trend as expenditures and deficits, it is likely that the budget
process would shorten over time as budgeting actors become more
familiar with budgeting under the Statutory PAYGO Act. Furthermore,
the economic history of the period in question cannot be forgotten.
Although, these events can be controlled for with GDP, those measures
do not account for the larger political effects associated with ‘Great
Recession’ and how they may impact budgeting. Only time will tell if
this explanation pans out, though. Future research should continue to
consider how the Statutory PAYGO Act is affecting the budgeting
process, and how budgeting actors are learning to work under these
new rules.
The findings surrounding the political and economic factors are not
particularly surprising and correspond, for the most part, with the
extant literature on fiscal gridlock. Party polarization, presidential
leadership, and a weak economy all contribute to gridlock in budget
negotiation process. This is due to the political nature of the bargaining
process and the availability of resources. The inconsistencies that
exist between and within models for the dependent variables, however,
do indicate there may be a complexity to these relationships as well.
This complexity is likely due to interactions that occur over time. As the
process control variables indicate, time does play a role in the process.
That is, the magnitude of the effects of the predictor variables may
fluctuate across the budgeting timeline as deadlines begin to
approach. The pressure to pass a budget only builds over time, so
there is an interaction that occurs with the pressure from the political
and economic factors. In other words, a weak economy early in the
process may have a less dramatic effect than a weak economy late in
the process, or vice versa. The same may be said for the magnitude
for the relationships of divided government and presidential
leadership. Future research should explore the effects of the political
and economic factors further while considering how the effects may
fluctuate throughout the timeline. Although some research has already
been produced on this topic, there is certainly room for further insight
and understanding about the exact nature of those relationships.
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The findings here have two important implications for the practice
of public budgeting. First, and foremost, PAYGO can alleviate some of
the conflict and complexity associated with the budgeting process,
when used properly. PAYGO rules may lead to a reduced number of
financing options, but this reduces the complexity of the budgeting
process. Furthermore, this reduced number of options may result in a
reduced number of issues on which to disagree. With less
disagreement and less complexity, comes a process that moves
quicker. Thus, PAYGO rules may be a suitable solution to public
jurisdictions and organizations that find themselves in a malaise of
fiscal gridlock. Second, ‘when used properly’ is the operative phrase.
Not all PAYGO rules are made equally. When considering PAYGO, the
specific design and implementation of the rules should be evaluated
thoroughly. As the comparison between the BEA and Statutory PAYGO
Act eras indicates, PAYGO as a broad concept is not a magic bullet and
does not lead to the same outcomes every time. Future research
should look deeper into the specific PAYGO mechanisms that do and
do not work in practice to determine how best the budgeting process
can be managed for results.
NOTES
1. November 13 to 19, 1995; December 15, 1995 to January 6,
1996; and September 30 to October 17, 2013.
2. Fiscal years 1995 and 1997.
3. In the event there were more than one median date (i.e., even
number of appropriations bills), the earlier date is included. In the
event that one appropriations bill falls into more than one of these
categories, it is included for all the categories it falls into for that
fiscal year (i.e., one consolidated package passed for the entire
fiscal year).
4. In the case that there is more than one median date, the earlier
date was identified.
5. Data was unavailable for 112th Congress (2012).
6. Use of the Prais-Winston correction did little to solve the problem,
so it was concluded that a more sophisticated technique was
necessary for the time-series analysis.
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7. Several analysis techniques were considered, but ARMA was found
to have the most applicable assumptions and to produce the most
effective estimations based on diagnostic tests and residual
variance.
8. The graphical distribution of the outcome variable most closely
matched that of the AR(1) distribution; testing of alternative forms
of the ARMA model supported this conclusion based on diagnostic
tests and residual variance. The ARMA model form was specified
based on 0 autoregressive term (p), 0 nonseasonal differences (d),
and 0 lagged forecast errors (q).
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